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Abstract A clear understanding of the term "species" is
fundamental to the subject of evolution. However, introduc-
tory textbooks often fail to address this topic until one of the
later chapters, after having used the term species in all
preceding chapters. Furthermore, definitions of terms critical
to a clear understanding of this subject are often vague or
absent in chapters on species concepts. We feel the popular
notion of a "species problem" has been unnecessarily inflated
by this less-than-effective educational approach. Clearly
addressing this essential subject at the beginning of a course
on evolution will prepare students to learn the details and
complexities of evolution. Here we provide the background
for an alternative approach to this foundational topic,
followed by an outlined lesson plan. We emphasize early
introduction of this subject in texts and courses using
unambiguous terminology and including the historical
development of species concepts.
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Introduction
The subject of species was not a matter of debate when
Carolus Linnaeus (1753) codified the taxonomic categories
in the eighteenth century. Yet the widely accepted species
concept of the time was faulty—a pre-Darwinian view of
species as fixed and eternal entities. After Darwin published
his Origin of Species in 1859, most scientists became
convinced that species evolve, and the static species concept
was largely abandoned. This recognition, however, launched
a debate within the scientific community over the correct
species concept, and a significant "species problem" was
born. Although our knowledge of evolutionary processes has
increased dramatically in the last 150 years, species concept
debates have intensified rather than subsided. In spite of this
apparent intractability, we feel that a good deal of the species
problem would be eliminated with a more effective approach
to teaching about species at the high school and college
levels.
Our goal in this article is to provide the background
necessary for a more effective approach to teaching about
species—as taxa, as a category, and as a concept. We hope
to clarify the subject for instructors and textbook authors so
they can present it to students in a way that will serve those
who will specialize in natural science as well as those who
will not. To do this, we first define the associated terms,
which are often confused and misused. We then provide a
brief history of the evolution of species concepts to clarify
the bases for current ones and to prevent repetition of past
mistakes. Next, we address more recent debates about the
best species concept and suggest a solution. Finally, we
outline a lesson plan that will provide students with a
clearer understanding of species as fundamental units of
eukaryotic evolution.
A Hierarchy of Species Terms
The term "species" can refer to: (1) a species taxon—that is,
a particular species found in nature (e.g., Puma concolor or
Acer grandidentatum); (2) the species category, whose
membership is composed of all of the species taxa; or (3) a
species concept, which defines the species category. A lack
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of specificity regarding these three terms results in
confusion, unnecessarily amplifying debates over the best
species concept. Therefore, we begin by examining these
terms more closely.
Species Taxa A species taxon (plural taxa) is simply a
named species (e.g., Homo sapiens). In this article, we will
use the unqualified term species to refer to one or more
species taxa. Species, unlike taxonomic categories or higher
taxa, can be located in space and time, and each has a
function—to evolve. Every species is a real entity—a
cohesive unit composed of interacting parts (organisms).
Furthermore, each species evolves as a unit. As a result,
each species changes over time and eventually becomes
extinct or speciates.
The Species Category The species category is a rank in the
hierarchical system codified by Linnaeus (1753)—one of
the seven to ten major taxonomic categories (kingdom,
phylum, class, order, etc.), which are often further divided
(e.g., subfamily or subspecies). The members of each
taxonomic category are particular taxa at that taxonomic
level. For example, the kingdom category is composed of
all the described biological kingdoms (Animalia, Plantae,
etc.), while the genus category contains all described
genera, and the species category contains all known
species. Taxonomic categories are abstract constructs aimed
at organizing the diversity of life (Dobzhansky 1935).
Species Concepts By broadly defining the species category,
a species concept defines the nature of any and all species.
Species concepts have a long history with many versions and
incarnations, some of which have coexisted as competing
concepts. Although many have been promoted as the best by
their authors (see Slobodchikoff 1976; Claridge et al. 1997;
Wheeler and Meier 2000; Coyne and Orr 2004), the
following overarching concept subsumes most of those
without contradicting them: a species in nature is composed
of organisms in one or more populations that together form a
cohesive, reproductive unit—a separate lineage on its own
evolutionary trajectory (Simpson 1951; Hennig 1966; Wiley
1978; Wiley and Mayden 2000; Ghiselin 2002; de Queiroz
2005; Rieseberg et al. 2006). This primary species concept
provides the necessary and sufficient traits required of
species for membership in the species category.
The Unique Nature of Species
Species are often treated like higher taxa, differing in rank
only, yet higher taxa are fundamentally different. For
instance, the members of a family are genera that share a
common ancestor; but those genera do not interact as a
family unit because no biological processes unite them. They
are not unified by location or time or function. One cannot
point to the order Arthropoda because their members have
no common location in space; and with both extinct and
extant members, Arthropoda share no location in time.
Higher taxa are convenient concepts to categorize related
taxa. Species, however, are not concepts—they are very
different entities indeed.
Species are individuals and fundamental units of
evolution (Ghiselin 1966, 1974; Hennig 1966; Hull 1976;
Eldredge 1985; de Queiroz and Donoghue 1988; Ridley
1989; Mayr 1996; Coleman and Wiley 2001; Crane 2004;
Rieppel 2009). Individuals can be located in both space and
time, and they are composed of parts (rather than members)
that function as a unit. The parts of a species (organisms)
interact to form a unique, reproductively cohesive whole
whose function is to evolve.
Like all individuals, species defy definition (Ghiselin
1974; Hull 1976) because they change over time. A
mountain will lift and erode, a cicada will grow and molt,
and a species will expand and evolve. Yet individuals
remain identifiable over time. A middle-aged man may bear
little resemblance to the dark-and-curly-haired version of
his youth, but his mother will still recognize him. A
species, like H. sapiens, changes with each new birth and
death. Indeed, H. sapiens has changed a great deal since its
inception nearly 200,000 years ago (Randerson 2003) while
remaining the same species throughout. The species
concept defines the nature of all species, yet no particular
species can be defined because each is a constantly
evolving individual.
Although the paradigm of species-as-individuals has
been accepted for decades (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1988;
Coleman and Wiley 2001; Stamos 2007; Rieppel 2009), the
view is not intuitively obvious because species' parts appear
so loosely organized. One never sees a species in its
entirety as a separate, cohesive unit (unless it is on the brink
of extinction and composed of so few organisms that they
can all be seen at once). At best, we might see a herd of elk
or a stand of spruce. We are far more comfortable with
archetypal individuals like organisms, whose parts appear
tightly organized into single, recognizable units. But
relative distances are a matter of perspective. The parts of
an atom have relatively vast distances between them, as do
the parts of a molecule, a species, or a solar system. What
they all have in common are mechanisms that organize their
parts into cohesive wholes—the parts of an atom by the
electromagnetic and nuclear forces, the parts of a molecule
by covalent and hydrogen bonds, the parts of a species by
sex, and the parts of a solar system by gravity.
The paradigm of species as eternal classes, with each
organism as a representative member rather than a part,
spanned some 2,500 years. Yet organisms are no more
instances of their species than leaves are instances of a tree.
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Organisms cannot represent their species because they
cannot evolve. In spite of these evident facts, the millennial
concept of species as definable classes still lingers,
culturally entrenched and not easily relinquished. A brief
review of the history of species concepts will reveal why
such confusion remains.
The History of Species Ideas
The history of our evolving understanding of species can be
broken down into two major time periods. The first was a
prolonged period in which species were viewed as eternal
entities. In this regard, each species was considered to be a
definable class of representative organisms. Although
incorrect, this consistent and uncontroversial viewpoint
was the perceived wisdom for well over 2,000 years until
1859 when Darwin presented his far more accurate theory
of evolving species. Yet the post-Darwinian phase has been
beset by controversy and unending debates about the true
nature of species.
The Pre-Darwinian Species Concept
From the pioneering philosophers of ancient Greece and
Asia Minor came two competing theories: a rational view
of species as changing entities versus a mystical view of
species as permanent entities. Eventually, the latter pre-
vailed. The static species concept achieved a level of
unquestioned certainty from its connection to giants of
intellectual thought and its eventual adoption by political
and religious institutions. Yet the ascendance of this
mystical idea was largely an accident of history rather than
a natural outcome of prescientific cultures.
A secular school of philosophy emerged in Ionia on the
west coast of Asia Minor around 600 BCE, established by
the astronomer and mathematician Thales (640–550 BCE).
The school promoted rational approaches to cosmic ques-
tions (Durant 1953; Fuller and McMurrin 1957; Green
1973), a philosophy initiated by Thales, who proposed
natural explanations for earthquakes, volcanic eruptions,
solar eclipses, and other cosmic mysteries (Mayer 1950).
Thales' student, Anaximander (610–546 BCE), addressed the
origin and diversity of life, arguing that life was first formed
in the sea but was driven onto land as the waters receded,
with organisms developing the ability to breathe air (Mayer
1950; Popkin et al. 1999). Thus, our modern understanding
of species evolving in response to environmental change has
an ancient origin, provided by Anaximander over 2,500 years
ago.
Had the relative freedom of ideas continued unhindered
in Ionia, scientific progress would have inevitably opened
the door for someone like Darwin to pass through
considerably earlier than it did. But occupation by
tyrannical regimes limited free inquiry, and by 494 BCE,
many of the philosophers trained in this tradition had
dispersed to other regions (Mayer 1950). Although the
Ionian school's naturalistic approach to reality provided
prescient views of matter, life, and the cosmos, its influence
on the development of science would eventually be erased
by the philosophy of the Socratic school, largely due
(surprisingly) to Pythagoras of Samos.
Pythagoras (582–507 BCE) is justly remembered for his
contributions to mathematics, but he also played a critical
role in establishing the static species concept. Born on the
Ionian peninsula, Pythagoras fled to southern Italy and
started a communal school whose members made important
advances in mathematics (Jones 1969b). The Pythagoreans
were so enamored with numbers that they viewed formulas
as mystical abstractions controlling reality—from objects to
justice, morality, and the origin of the universe (Jones 1969b;
Dudley 1997). This mix of reason and mysticism included
the Pythagorean theorem, the pseudoscience of numerology,
and fantasies of out-of-body travel (Serafini 1993; Dudley
1997). Their ideas would eventually reach Plato in a
remarkably roundabout way, providing Plato with the
fundamental element of his own developing philosophy—a
philosophy that would influence western thought for
millennia and would establish the static species concept.
The Athenian philosopher Plato (428–348 BCE) devel-
oped some of his views under the tutorship of Socrates.
Forced to flee Athens at age 28 after his revered teacher
was executed, Plato spent 12 years in exile, learning about
social, political, and philosophical ideas in other cultures.
While visiting one of the last remaining Pythagorean
schools (Mayer 1950; Fuller and McMurrin 1957), he saw
in their formulaic mysticism a conceptual escape from a
world that appeared to be in flux. Plato, who was not a fan
of change, felt that without eternal certainties, knowledge
would be impossible (Keyt 1969). To provide certainty and
permanence to his vision of the universe, he argued that all
physical objects are perishable replicas that spring from
unchanging, eternal, perfect forms (Green 1973). Although
organisms change over time as they develop, age, and
deteriorate, their ideal forms remain eternal. This mystical
view portrayed each species as a class of imperfect
instances (the organisms) derived from an eternal ideal
form by which the species would be defined. Furthermore,
these perfect forms were not accessible by studying their
imperfect replicas here on earth. In Plato's view, only
philosophers have the training and intuition to examine
such abstractions (Jones 1969a).
Neither Plato nor his teacher Socrates were interested in
hands-on science, focusing instead on morality, virtue,
politics, and philosophy. However, Plato's student, Aristotle
(384–322 BCE), sought reality in living samples, arguing
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that Plato's mystical forms were found within the objects
themselves, thus encouraging the study of earthly things
(Jones 1969a). Aristotle's promotion of science did not,
however, change the prevailing view of species as static
entities. On the contrary, his success as a scientist and
brilliance as a logician lent credibility to the faulty Platonic
view of species as definable and unchanging classes.
Although there were classical philosophers who sought
answers without resorting to mysticism (e.g., Heraclitus of
Ephesus, Empedocles of Sicily, Democritus of Thrace,
Epicurus of Samos, Aristarchus of Samos, Eratosthenes of
Alexandria, and Lucretius of Rome), their more rational
ideas did not gain political traction. Instead, the accidents of
history enabled the mysticism of Pythagoras, modified by
Plato, to gain ascendancy via adoption by the state of Rome
(Popkin et al. 1999). In the early Common Era, Saint
Augustine merged Platonic philosophy with Christian
theology, providing scriptural dogma with intellectual force
(Gilson 1955). This political and theological nexus would
entrench the static species concept for centuries.
Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430) was a religious
philosopher who, like Plato, abhorred change (Outler
2006). He infused Christianity with a modified Platonism
by interpreting Plato's neutral, perfect forms as the hand of
God. Augustine argued that the degree of a creature's
imperfections was equal to its separation from God. This
transformation of Plato's philosophy grounded species
stasis in spiritual authority and divine creation. This
synthesis of classical philosophy and early Christian
theology presented a powerful belief system that went
unchallenged until civilization's intellectual emergence
from the Middle Ages.
Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), like Augustine,
developed a syncretic theology that would become the
prevailing wisdom and continue the static species concept;
but unlike the Augustinian synthesis, this new approach
would advance scientific research. Aquinas adored the
natural world and found much to be admired in the
scientific approach of Aristotle (Mayer 1950; Popkin et al.
1999). To blend Aristotelian philosophy with Christianity,
Aquinas argued that philosophy manages things that can be
proved empirically, while religion deals with that which
requires faith (Jones 1969a). This creative approach to
science and faith provided a noncombative worldview that
opened the door to research by devout Christians and kick-
started a revolution in science. Aquinas called this syncretic
vision natural theology, and its goal was the demonstration
of God's existence through the illumination of creation via
scientific research. Natural theology helped dissolve the
domination of orthodoxy and catalyze a tempo of discovery
that broke the intellectual stagnation of the Medieval
period. But natural theology's acquiescence to free thought
would be the agent of its own undoing (Crombie 1967) as
its practitioners unerringly paved the road to the Darwinian
revolution.
For a time, natural theology helped fortify and extend
the continuous thread of species fixity—a view that had, by
the thirteenth century, been a constant for well over a
thousand years. With each incarnation of the Pythagorean
conception of the permanence behind all things (via Plato,
Aristotle, Augustine, and now Aquinas), the concept of
species stasis was preserved, etching it as a normative
viewpoint across cultures and time. But natural theology
opened the Pandora's box of scientific inquiry.
Many devout natural theologians eagerly sought to
uncover the details of divine creation. The Franciscan
monks Roger Bacon (1214–1294) and William of Ockham
(1288–1348) helped develop the scientific method (Fuller
and McMurrin 1957; Popkin et al. 1999). The priest and
biologist John Ray (1628–1705) promoted the nobility and
sanctity of science, conducted groundbreaking scientific
research, and did early work in taxonomy (McMahon 2000).
The Swedish physician, botanist, and pioneering taxono-
mist Carolus Linnaeus (1707–1778) furthered the work of
Ray, codifying the field of taxonomy and expanding our
view of species diversity (Stace 1992). The courage,
intelligence, and creativity of a long list of religiously
devout luminaries of science—including Galileo Galilei,
Robert Boyle, Nicholas Steno, Sir Isaac Newton, James
Hutton, and Thomas Malthus—toppled many of the old
ideas in medicine, cosmology, physics, and geology. Yet the
dogma of species fixity persisted. This errant concept, so
deeply rooted in Western philosophy and creation myths,
held the field of biology back while the other scientific
fields leapt forward (Hull 1965). Charles Darwin would
finally provide the keys to understanding and accepting
the reality of evolving species, breaking the millennial
stranglehold. He would do this by standing on the shoulders
of natural theologians.
Species Concepts since Darwin
By the middle of the nineteenth century, important
discoveries by natural theologians had accumulated to a
point that many of the old ideas based on religious dogma
were straining at their leashes. Clearly, the earth was far
older than the alleged ∼6,000 years since the beginning of
the Biblical creation, and fossils were now recognized as
evidence of extinct species. Furthermore, stratigraphic
successions of fossilized faunal groups demonstrated that
not all species had come into being at the moment of
creation (Koutsoukos 2007).
Evolution had been in the air in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries in one form or another, promoted by
various theorists including Pierre Maupertuis, Georges-
Louis Leclerc, Darwin's grandfather Erasmus Darwin, Jean-
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Baptiste Lamarck, Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Robert
Grant, and Robert Chambers. Yet without a thoroughly
documented and widely accepted theory, complete with one
or more viable mechanisms, none of these respected names
in science effectively dislodged creationist views and the
static species concept, nor did they gain serious consider-
ation by the wider scientific community (Provine 1982;
Richards 1992).
Charles Darwin, originally a natural theologian himself,
embarked on his trip aboard the HMS Beagle well prepared
to study natural history, having read (or would soon read)
the important ideas in related fields of science. Although
proponents of biological evolution had yet to demonstrate a
functional mechanism, the dramatic variation and sheer
numbers of newly discovered species and fossils had
become very difficult to explain without such a theory.
After returning from his voyage, Darwin pieced together
many lines of evidence (fossils, geology, morphology,
biogeography, breeding experiments, etc.) along with a
detailed model incorporating exponential reproduction,
limited resources, competition, and the mechanism of
natural selection of heritable traits (Darwin 1859).
After Darwin presented his richly supported case in his
1859 publication Origin of Species, the bulk of the
scientific community rapidly accepted his theory (Gregory
2008). Many of Darwin's contemporaries, including T. H.
Huxley, were so struck by the theory's simplicity and
rationality that it freed them from the dilemma of choosing
between insufficiently supported evolutionary hypotheses
(Durant 1953; Provine 1982). Within 15 years, this
paradigmatic shift was complete (Mayr 1991; Stamos
2007). Yet during the same period, a contentious debate
developed regarding the details of speciation (Provine
1971). Rather than settling the question of the species
concept, this first rational and supportable theory of
evolution gave birth to a contentious and evolving debate
that came to be known as the species problem.
In Darwin's view, the evolutionary process was exceed-
ingly gradual (and he had his supporters). However, some
contemporaries considered the process to be one of sudden
change (termed saltation) between long periods of stasis
(Provine 1971; Bowler 1988). Those who subscribed to
speciation by saltation, with its modified form of the static
species concept, included Thomas H. Huxley ("Darwin's
bulldog"), Francis Galton (a brilliant scientist, admirer, and
cousin), and the paleontologist and early Darwin supporter,
Othniel C. Marsh (Provine 1971; Bowler 1988). Still other
supporters of evolution strayed far from Darwin's theory of
a branching bush with a progressive view of evolution
directed toward H. sapiens at the pinnacle of a very linear
tree. These progressionists (who envisioned humans as
evolution's ultimate end product) included Earnst Haekel
and Robert Chambers (Bowler 1988). With Darwin's most
admiring supporters debating the most important details
of his theory (a majority of whom still viewed species as
fixed classes), consensus on a species concept did not
approach resolution, and the influence of species stasis
remained.
At the time of Darwin's death in 1882, hundreds of
articles on evolution had been written in response to his
theory (Provine 1982). Although biological evolution had
become an accepted scientific theory, the majority of
biologists questioned the validity of natural selection, and
by the turn of the century, Darwin's view of gradual
evolution had largely been supplanted by saltation. The
rediscovery of Mendel's research by Hugo De Vries in 1900
gave saltationists added leverage, since they felt mutations
provided the mechanism for sudden evolutionary leaps, and
De Vries' mutation theory posited speciation could even
occur in a single jump. These so-called Mendelians were
opposed by the Darwinians, including Karl Pearson and W.
F. R. Weldon (Provine 1971).
The biometric approach of Darwinian gradualists began
to illuminate the effects of gene flow, genetic drift, and the
Mendelian foundation for continuous phenotypic variation,
leading to the demise of saltationism and its overemphasis on
mutation. Subsequently, the Modern Synthesis of Mendelian
genetics and Darwinian evolution (Provine 1971; Stamos
2007) brought a very brief period of relative consensus to the
species problem by the 1940s. Dobzhansky's (1937) Gene-
tics and the Origin of Species established the Modern
Synthesis, and both Dobzhansky (1935) and Mayr (1942)
provided the broadly accepted biological species concept
(BSC) based on reproductive isolation. Yet, as Mayr pointed
out, taxonomists at that time still held static views of species
while paradoxically supporting the theory of evolution.
Decades later, the field of taxonomy (in its incarnation as
phylogenetic systematics) would become the cutting edge of
evolutionary biology. In the 1940s, however, the delusion of
species stasis remained a cultural phenomenon that pre-
vented a broad recognition of species as dynamic, evolving
individuals.
By 1951, George Gaylord Simpson was developing the
evolutionary species concept, which posited that each
species in nature was "a lineage... evolving independently
of others, with its own separate and unitary evolutionary
role and tendencies." Simpson was looking for an
overarching definition that would avoid competition with
other species concepts, and he felt the criterion of
reproductive isolation was an unnecessary requirement
given that many species, which might otherwise inter-
breed, had achieved the necessary separation to evolve
independently. The disagreement between Mayr and
Simpson launched a round of species-concept debates
among evolutionary biologists that has yet to subside.
Instead, it has accelerated (Hey 2006).
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Most of today's competing species concepts are opera-
tional (Mayden 1997, 1999) in that they suggest empirical
methods of species discovery or delineation. Individually,
operational concepts fail to recognize all species that, along
with asexual entities and the ever-present percentage of
unassigned individuals, represent the length and breadth of
biodiversity. For instance, under the BSC, species status is
achieved only when a reproductive barrier has evolved,
which is not a requirement of the Ecological Species
Concept (EcSC Van Valen 1976). The EcSC, on the other
hand, requires that species be lineages that are ecologically
distinct, which is not a requirement of the BSC. Demon-
strating either reproductive or ecological isolation for a
group of populations will strongly indicate their status as a
species. Both concepts are valuable, yet neither is an ideal
approach in all circumstances. Furthermore, demonstrating
evidence for a species under more than one operational
concept provides corroborative support. These operational
species concepts should be viewed not as competing
definitions that falsely inflate the so-called species problem,
but as compatible concepts consistent with an ontological
understanding of species that has been in effect for decades.
A proliferation of species concepts demonstrates the
positive impact of evolutionary theory. Rather than posing a
problem, multiple operational species concepts are a natural
outcome of the development of new technologies and the
impact of the results those technologies provide. The zeal
of specialists has, however, led to the mistaken idea that
operational concepts should supersede one another rather
than coexist as consilient evolutionary tools for clearly
describing one's approach to research. An overarching
nonoperational species concept subsuming valid operation-
al concepts provides a solution to this debate. Mayden
(1997, 1999) proposed just such a hierarchy of concepts.
His nonoperational, primary species concept—essentially
the combined evolutionary species concepts of Simpson
(1961) and Hennig (1966) paraphrased in the Species
Concepts subsection above—recognizes species as individ-
uals and is neither biased nor limited by the types of
eukaryotic taxa examined nor the technologies used in
identification.
A New Educational Approach to the Subject of Species
In many textbooks on evolution, the subject of species
concepts is presented in one of the later chapters. Freeman
and Herron (2007) do not address species concepts until
chapter 16 of their 20-chapter textbook. The subject is
tackled in part four of five in Ridley (2003), chapter 11 of
12 in Stearns and Hoekstra (2005), part five of six in Hall
and Hallgrimsson (2007), chapter 22 of 26 in Barton et al.
(2007), and chapter 17 of 23 in Futuyma (2009). The
approaches in these texts tend to perpetuate the species
problem by leaving critical terms undefined while high-
lighting the competition between various operational
concepts.
In our view, a chapter on the subject of species should
be presented as an essential lesson in one of the earliest
chapters (ideally immediately following an introductory
chapter presenting the discoveries of Darwin and Mendel). A
well-laid-out chapter, lecture, or series of lectures for this
fundamental subject should include three components: (1) a
broad history detailing our evolving understanding of species
found in nature, (2) a clear explanation of the associated
terminology, and (3) a general discussion of species concepts.
Here we outline a possible approach, which can be expanded
or reduced based on the time available, scholastic level, and
goals of the course.
Day One:
I. (10 minutes): Introduction
A. Introduce the concept of species by engaging the
students, asking them to name species they find
interesting, unique, closely related, distantly relat-
ed, etc. The goal is to have them connect with their
own understanding of what species are.
B. Show images of various species, with both com-
mon names and scientific names. Discuss the value
of scientific names—their worldwide universality.
C. It is useful to compare species that are closely
related yet distinct (such as species of marmoset),
clearly related yet distantly (e.g., hummingbirds and
ostriches), very dissimilar but surprisingly related
(e.g., hyrax and elephant), and species that appear
similar or the same due to convergent evolution
(mimics such as monarch and viceroy butterflies or
the marsupial squirrel glider, Petaurus norfolcensis,
of Australia, and the placental northern flying
squirrel, Glaucomys sabrinus, of temperate North
America).
II. (5 minutes): Explain that species have been recognized
as separate entities by all cultures
A. Provide images of various species that demonstrate
the need for accurate identification
B. Cultures relied on accurate identification for
survival (taxonomy is the oldest profession!):
1. Many species illustrate this, such as harmless
king snakes and similarly colored venomous
coral snakes and poisonous plants and fungi that
resemble edible varieties.
III. (20 minutes): Discuss the historical development of
species concepts as a means of introducing the related
94 Evo Edu Outreach (2010) 3:89–98
terminology and to provide an interesting and enter-
taining arc to grab student interest:
A. Start with the Ionian philosopher Pythagoras of
Samos, whom students might assume to be a
paragon of rationality given his penchant for
mathematics and proportion (e.g., the Pythagorean
Theorem). However, Pythagoras and those in the
Pythagorean movement were also steeped in occult
rituals and pseudoscientific beliefs. They felt that
all reality was governed by eternal mathematical
formulas.
B. Briefly discuss the Ionian school of Miletus, whose
theorists (unlike the Pythagoreans) sought rational
explanations to earthly and cosmic phenomena
(mention Thales and Anaximander).
C. Describe the early concepts of evolution held by
Anaximander (610–546 BCE).
D. Explain that it was Plato's philosophy—an out-
growth of Pythagorean mysticism—that led to the
establishment of the nonevolutionary idea of
species as eternal entities, which became the
prevailing species concept for over 2,000 years.
This scientific theory became incorporated into
religious doctrine (by St Augustine in the fourth
and fifth centuries, and modernized by St Thomas
Aquinas in the thirteenth century), giving it added
authority and longevity.
E. Discuss the emergence of Natural Theology and
the remarkable scientific contributions by its
practitioners who did groundbreaking science in
their quest to uncover the details of God's creation
(e.g., Galileo Galilei, Johann Kepler, John Ray,
Isaac Newton, Carolus Linnaeus, and Gregor
Mendel).
F. Briefly discuss the taxonomic system codified by
Linnaeus (with all taxa, including species).
G. This is a good time to clarify the three important
terms involving species: (1) species taxa as
codified by Linnaeus; (2) the species category,
whose membership includes all the species; and
(3) the species concept, which defines the
species category and the nature of all species
within it. At the time of Linnaeus, everyone still
viewed all species as unchanging. Thus, the
static species concept defined species as eternal
entities, each defined by a set of necessary
traits.
IV. (15 minutes): Discuss Darwin's revolutionary idea.
Since the students should already be familiar with
Darwin's and Mendel's discoveries, this can be a very
brief recap, emphasizing instead the impact on the
scientific community rather than on the details of
evolutionary change.
A. Begin by briefly discussing earlier proponents
of evolution (Erasmus Darwin, Jean-Baptiste
Lamarck, etc.), and explain that their ideas failed
to gain wide acceptance because they lacked a
well-supported mechanism for evolutionary
change.
B. Explain the impact of Darwin's (1859) publication
of Origin of Species.
1. Remind them of Darwin's argument that natural
selection provided the mechanism for evolution-
ary change.
2. Mention the extensive evidence he provided:
fossils, patterns of variation in both human-
selected and wild species, and patterns suggesting
branching lineages across space and time.
3. Emphasize what a radical challenge this was to
the 2,500-year-old static species concept, since
evolution by natural selection suggested species
were not static at all but constantly changing,
evolving, entities.
4. If you have time, you might mention some
comments from the last important scientists who
remained supporters of the static species concept
(e.g., Louis Agassi and Lord Kelvin) to further
illustrate the challenge Darwin faced.
Day Two:
I. (15 minutes): Discuss Darwin's ideas and the two
opposing species concepts it launched.
A. Once evolution was accepted, many tried to
combine the static species concept with the new
theory of evolution, arguing that species would
have long periods of stasis and then experience
sudden evolutionary change in a process called
saltation. Others, including Darwin, considered
evolution an imperceptibly slow process called
gradualism.
B. When Mendel's research was rediscovered, the
saltationists felt vindicated, arguing mutation was
the mechanism of sudden evolutionary change.
But the gradualists felt that large mutations were
nearly always deleterious while selectively ad-
vantageous mutations would be too rare to be
important.
C. Explain that eventually careful studies demonstrat-
ed that both Mendel's and Darwin's discoveries
worked together to explain gradual evolutionary
change, including continuous quantitative varia-
tion, leading to an end to the saltationist concepts
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and culminating in the Modern Synthesis of
evolutionary theory.
II. (10 minutes): The Modern Synthesis advanced evolu-
tionary biology, leading to evolutionary concepts of
species.
A. Even after the static species concept was aban-
doned, remnants remained
1. Species were still thought of as classes whose
members were individual organisms.
2. Organisms were classified as members of a
species by a set of required traits.
3. Species were often defined by a type specimen,
suggesting each species was a fixed type.
B. However, since species are evolving entities, with
only a subset of organisms contributing their traits
to each new generation, a species never remains
quite the same and can therefore never be defined
1. With the development of protein and DNA analyt-
ical techniques, it became even more apparent that
species are constantly changing, as the fittest
members successfully reproduce and pass on their
genetically heritable traits.
2. The gene pool for a species will change to some
degree every generation. It even changes with
each birth and death.
C. By the 1960s and 1970s, researchers were finally
beginning to relinquish the ancient idea of species
as definable classes, recognizing them instead as
individuals.
III. (10 minutes): Species taxa versus higher taxa
A. Describe the Linnaean system of taxonomic cate-
gories and the taxa within them
1. Give the Linnaean hierarchy as often used today
a) Domain, kingdom, phylum, class, order,
family, genus, species
2. Provide examples of species and the higher taxa
within which they are organized
B. Explain how species (as objective individuals) are
radically different than higher taxa (which are histor-
ical entities arbitrarily chosen to categorize species)
IV. (15 minutes): Evolutionary species concepts.
A. It became apparent that all species are the
culmination of evolutionary lineages. This led to
the development of new species concepts that
recognized species as evolving individuals.
1. Many species concepts suggested a method of
discovery (genetic, ecological, morphological, etc.)
2. These operational concepts were backed by
different analytical methods
B. Although many concepts were promoted as superior
to the rest, their operational approaches to species
recognition limited the scope of each. They are,
therefore, secondary species concepts that should be
considered complimentary rather than exclusive.
C. Give the primary species concept that defines the
species category:
1. A species in nature is composed of organisms in
one or more populations that together form a
cohesive, separately evolving reproductive unit.
a) There may be a great deal of diversity, or
relatively little, within any single species, but
each evolves on its own, with little or no
input from other species.
b) Few isolating mechanisms are foolproof,
from geographic isolation to chromosomal
incompatibility. But with enough reproduc-
tive isolation, a reproductively cohesive set of
populations will diverge as a unit, becoming
increasingly unique.
c) Although no species can be defined since no
set of traits will permanently remain in an
evolving species, the shared traits of the
organisms that make up a species at any
point in time can be analyzed, and the
findings enable researchers to delineate the
geographical boundaries of a species and
identify their component organisms.
d) Note that operational species concepts would
be secondary to this primary concept
Conclusion
We are currently leaving students unprepared for the details of
evolution by failing to provide them with a general under-
standing of species at the beginning of biology textbooks and
courses. Offering them incomplete details of the subject late in
the course only exacerbates their confusion.
Students will benefit from a summarized account of the
long and fitful history of species concepts. Not only
enlightening scientifically, it is an intriguing story about
species and human nature that can capture students'
attention. Understanding this history will impart a measure
of inoculation against repeating past mistakes and mis-
conceptions, which are in large part the nature of what
some consider the species problem today (Wiley 2002).
Understanding the terminology inherent to the subject of
species provides an additional line of defense against
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falling prey to vague assertions of a species problem. By
grasping the differences between species as either individ-
ual entities in nature, the taxonomic category, or concepts
defining the species category and its members, students will
be better equipped to address the finer points of evolution-
ary theory. Furthermore, they will have the background
necessary to demand clarity from others so that a meeting
of minds on the subject is possible. Students of biology
versed in all three components of this subject—history,
terminology, and concepts—will be prepared to pursue
challenging questions of taxonomy and systematics and the
relationship of those questions to all fields of biology—
from ecology to genomics to conservation.
Because species are what in fact evolve, the three
components of this subject should be addressed at the
beginning of any course on evolution. Students will then
understand that species are real entities and fundamental
evolutionary units, and only then will they be prepared to
tackle the broader subject of evolution.
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